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Abstract
We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only
one of two possible actions is observable to others. When called upon,
agents (who decide in some random order that they do not know) are
only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the
observable action before them. This informational structure arises nat-
urally in many applications. Our most important result is that only
one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the
observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises.
Our results may have important policy consequences. Central agencies,
for example in the health sector, may optimally decide to withhold in-
formation from the public.
1 Introduction
A hiring committee must make a decision on a job candidate who has just
been interviewed. The candidate mentions that three other companies have
already made him an o⁄er, information that the committee can verify. On the
other hand, the committee can only speculate on how many rival companies
have already rejected the candidate￿ s job application.
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1A manager of a venture capital ￿rm discusses a project with an inventor
who needs capital to develop a new product. The inventor has already secured
funds from two other venture capital ￿rms, information that the present man-
ager can verify. The manager will also have some private information about
the viability of the project but he can only speculate about how often the
inventor was turned down by other rival ￿rms who thought that the project
was bad.1
A restaurant goer must decide whether or not he wants to dine at a par-
ticular restaurant he stands in front of. He has some private information on
how good the restaurant is, and he is able to peer through the window to
see how many others have already decided to dine there. But he can only
speculate about how many others stood before the same door and decided to
pass.
What these examples have in common is that agents who have to decide
between two options have only aggregate information about one of the two
options (o⁄ering a job, ￿nancing a project, dining in a restaurant), simply
because the choice of the other option is not observable. In this paper we
study the properties of social learning in this type of environment.
This informational environment appears to arise rather naturally in many
social interactions. Like in the case of the restaurant goer or the venture
capital ￿rm, in many circumstances, a decision maker can gather some aggre-
gate information (how many ￿rms have already adopted a new technology,
invested in a speci￿c project, etc.), but he can rarely observe all the individual
decisions. Clearly, if the decision is binary, knowing the number of agents who
have made a certain decision also helps to update on the number of agents
who have made the opposite decision. But this is not equivalent to knowing
it. And as we will show below this makes an important di⁄erence for social
learning.
The social learning literature so far has focussed on situations where,
in principle, all available actions are observable. The standard model of
informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992, and Bikhchandani et al., 1992), for
1This example could also be extended to the market for syndicated loans where several
banks jointly o⁄er funds to a borrowing ￿rm. See for example Su￿ (2007) for an empirical
analysis of the e⁄ect of information provision between several lenders and the borrower on
the syndicate structure of the contract.
2instance, contemplates a sequence of binary decisions which are all observable.
Agent n knows whether each predecessor in the sequence, from agent 1 to
agent n ￿ 1, decided in favor of one option or the other. Several studies
since have relaxed these stringent assumptions, some of which we discuss
brie￿ y below. However, the question of what happens if some actions are not
observable at all has not been addressed yet.
In the standard sequential model of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et
al. (1992) informational cascades arise: at a certain point in the sequence,
agents rationally neglect their own private information, i.e., they choose the
same action independently of the information they receive (for instance be-
cause they follow the decisions of the predecessors). In particular, di⁄erent
types of cascades can arise. If the decision is binary, say, between investing
and not, there can be cascades where, from a certain point onwards, all deci-
sion makers decide to invest, as well as cascades where, from a certain point
onwards, all decisions makers decide not to invest. At a ￿rst glance, one could
think that this may be the case in our set up, too. If a restaurant goer sees
many people in a restaurant, he could disregard his information and just join
the crowd; and if he sees the restaurant empty, he could decide to go some-
where else independently of his private signal. However, we can prove that,
on the contrary, only the ￿rst cascade is possible. In equilibrium cascades
on the unobservable action cannot arise and a restaurant about which some
people have read good reviews will not remain empty for ever.
In many scenarios with binary actions, one of the available actions arises
naturally as the observable action. There are, however, also some important
cases where third parties may have the power to decide what kind of infor-
mation is provided to agents. An example is the disclosure policy of a health
agency. A central agency in health policy must decide how to disclose infor-
mation on the adoption of a new treatment. One possibility is to inform the
doctors on how many others have already decided to adopt the new treat-
ment. Another is to inform them on how many have considered doing it but
have judged that it is preferable to stick to the old practice. A third possi-
bility is to reveal both, the number of doctors in favor of the new practice
and the number of physicians in favor of the old one. Since in equilibrium
there cannot be a cascade on the unobservable action and since the central
agency can choose which action to make observable, it can essentially rule out
3one of the two cascades￿ by withholding information. In summary, we like to
argue that the aggregate information set up that we introduce here has not
only several intriguing properties￿ some of which are in stark contrast to the
predictions of the standard model￿ it also has potentially important policy
implications.
Other papers in the social learning literature have studied what happens
when we remove the strong assumption that agents can observe the entire
history of individual decisions.2 Smith and Słrensen (1998) study a sequential
decision model in which agents can only observe unordered random samples
from predecessors￿actions (e.g., because of word of mouth communication).
With unbounded private signals complete learning eventually obtains in their
model. Similarly, Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) present a model in which,
at every time, a continuum of agents choose a binary action after observing
a sample of previous decisions (and, possibly, of signals on the outcomes).
This can be interpreted as a model of word of mouth communication in large
populations. The authors ￿nd su¢ cient conditions (on the sampling rule,
etc.) for herding to arise, and conditions for all agents to settle on the correct
choice. ˙elen and Kariv (2004) extend the standard model of sequential
social learning by allowing each agent to observe the decision of his immediate
predecessor only. The prediction of these authors is that behavior does not
settle on a single action. Long periods of herding can be observed, but switches
to the other action occur. As time passes, the periods of herding become
longer and longer, and the switches increasingly rare. Finally, Larson (2006)
is close to our paper in that he analyzes a situation in which agents observe
the pooled average action of a population of their predecessors (before making
a choice in a continuous action space). In contrast to our work, the focus of
the study is not on whether a cascade occurs or not, but on the speed of
learning (since the continuous action space guarantees that complete learning
eventually occurs).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce the formal model. We present its equilibrium analysis in Section 3.
Section 4 contains an example. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2For comprehensive surveys of the literature see, among others, Gale (1996), Hirshleifer
and Theo (2003), Chamley (2004) and Vives (2007).
42 The Model
In our economy there are n agents who have to decide in sequence whether or
not to take up a certain option. For convenience, we shall refer to this choice
as the decision about whether or not to invest. Time is discrete and indexed
by t = 1;2;:::;n. Each agent makes his choice only once in the sequence.
Agent i￿ s (i = 1;2;:::;n) action space is given by f0;1g, where 1 is interpreted
as investment. Player i￿ s action is denoted by Ii 2 f0;1g. An agent￿ s payo⁄
￿i depends on his choice and on the true state of the world ! 2 f0;1g. The
prior probability of ! = 1 is r 2 (0;1). If ! = 1 agent i receives a payo⁄ of
1 if he chooses to invest, and a payo⁄ of zero otherwise; vice versa if ! = 0.
That is,
￿i = !Ii + (1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ Ii):
The sequence in which agents make their choices is randomly determined
before the ￿rst agent makes a decision, and agents are, w.l.o.g., (re-)numbered
according to their positions: agent i chooses at time i only. All sequences are
equally likely. The agents are, however, not informed about which sequence
has been chosen. Furthermore, they do not know their own position in the
sequence. When called upon, agent i is only informed about the total number
of agents before him who have decided to invest. In other words, the decision
to invest is assumed to be the only observable action. This means that, while
the aggregate number of investments is observable, each individual decision to
invest or not is not publicly known. We denote the total number of agents who
have invested before agent i by Ti, i.e., agent i is informed about Ti =
Pi￿1
j=1 Ij.
In addition to observing Ti, each agent i receives a private signal ￿i 2 f0;1g
that is correlated with the true state !. In particular, we assume that each
agent receives a symmetric binary signal distributed as follows:
Pr(￿i = 1 j ! = 1) = Pr(￿i = 0 j ! = 0) ￿ q.
Note that, conditional on the state of the world, the signals are i.i.d.. We
shall refer to ! = 1 as the ￿good state￿and to ! = 0 as the ￿bad state.￿A
signal pointing in the direction of the good state (￿i = 1) shall be called a
￿good signal￿and a signal pointing in the opposite direction (￿i = 0) a ￿bad
signal.￿We assume that 1 > q > r and that r + q > 1. These conditions
ensure that, in the one-agent case, an agent would invest after a good signal
5but not after a bad signal, which renders the problem interesting. Note that
these two conditions also imply that q > 1
2, i.e., that the signal respects
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Finally, the signal is not perfectly
informative, which makes social learning possible and relevant.
Agent i￿ s information set is, therefore, represented by the couple (Ti;￿i).
An agent￿ s strategy Ii maps (Ti;￿i) into an action, i.e.,
Ii : f0;1;2;:::;n ￿ 1g ￿ f0;1g ! f0;1g.
An agent￿ s mixed strategy induces, for each (Ti;￿i), a probability with which
the agent invests. We denote the probability with which agent i invests after
observing (Ti;￿i) by Ii(Ti;￿i).
To conclude the description of our model, it is useful to introduce the no-
tion of an aggregate information cascade. The de￿nition is virtually identical
to the standard de￿nition of information cascade, with the characteristic that
histories are summarized by the aggregate statistic Ti.
De￿nition 1 An aggregate information cascade (AIC) occurs when, along
the equilibrium path, there is a critical value of Ti after which all agents choose
an action independently of their signal. In particular:
In an aggregate up cascade (AUC) there is a critical value TUP such that
if Tk = TUP all agents from k onwards choose to invest regardless of their
private signals. Consequently, there is some k such that Tk+j = Tk +j for all
j = 1;:::;n ￿ k.
In an aggregate down cascade (ADC) there is a critical value TDOWN such
that if Tk = TDOWN all agents from k onwards choose not to invest regardless
of their private signals. Consequently, in an ADC there is some k such that
Tk+j = Tk for all j = 1;:::;n ￿ k.
There is one small curiosity that can arise in our model. In some cases
there are multiple equilibria such that an equilibrium that triggers a cascade
can coexist with one that does not. In these cases, players who coordinate at
TUP on the AUC equilibrium could revert to the other equilibrium at TUP +1
(as no more new information is revealed). We shall rule this out, i.e., we
shall assume that once agents have coordinated on an aggregate information
cascade they will stay coordinated on that cascade.3
3This is intuitive as coordination on complicated switching patterns is perhaps less salient
6We are now ready to start analyzing the equilibrium decisions in our
economy.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to understand the social learning process
that occurs in our economy. Each agent can learn about the true state of the
world from the aggregate information that he receives about other agents￿
choices. This can lead to better decisions. On the other hand, it may be that
also in our economy, as in the canonical model of social learning of Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), there is room for information cascades.
In such a case, the process of information aggregation will not be e¢ cient.
We will show that, indeed, ￿up cascades￿of investments are possible even in
our set up, as they are in the canonical model. In contrast, ￿down cascades￿
of non-investments never occur in equilibrium.
We shall restrict the entire analysis to symmetric Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria (PBNEs). For convenience, we shall sometimes drop the quali￿ca-
tion and simply speak of an ￿equilibrium.￿ 4
To start our analysis, it is convenient to focus ￿rst on the case of Ti = 0, in
which an agent observes that no one has invested before him. At a ￿rst glance,
the decision problem in such a situation appears to be fairly complicated. If
the agent knew that Ti = 0 simply because he is the ￿rst decision maker, then
he should certainly follow his private signal, since that is the only information
available. If, instead, he knew that he is not the ￿rst decision maker, then he
could decide not to invest independently of the signal, as other agents have
already chosen the non-investment option. Intuitively, one might think that
Ti = 0 is pretty bad information if there are many players. Suppose that n
is very large and you observe that nobody has invested before you. But at
the same time your own private signal is good. Would you trust your own
signal? Of course, the answer to this question would depend on the other
than coordination on a cascade. Moreover, for AUCs one can use a re￿nement argument
to get the same result. If there is the slightest uncertainty about which equilibrium players
coordinated on at T
UP when observing T
UP + 1 the indi⁄erence will be broken as the
increase in T might now actually be due to an additional good signal.
4Our economy is represented by a symmetric game and there is nothing in the envi-
ronment that could help agents to coordinate on an asymmetric outcome. Therefore, the
restriction to symmetric equilibria is very natural.
7agents￿strategies. While the problem is made hard due to the fact that the
agent does not know his position in the sequence, it is made easier due to the
fact that the only thing that matters about other agents￿strategies is what
these specify for the very same case of Ti = 0.
To attack the problem, let us start with the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 2 An initially-pure equilibrium (IPE) is an equilibrium that pre-
scribes pure actions for Ti = 0 and both possible signal realizations ￿i = 0 and
￿i = 1.
Note that there can be mixing in an IPE after observing Ti > 0. The
de￿nition of an IPE just excludes the cases in which an agent mixes after
observing Ti = 0. We are able to establish some results that focus on Ti = 0.
First, we prove that in any IPE agents must follow their signal after observing
Ti = 0: there cannot exist IPEs in which an agent plays independently of his
signal or plays against it.
Lemma 1 In any IPE, an agent follows his own signal if he observes that
nobody has invested so far, i.e., Ii(0;￿i) = ￿i for all i.
Proof We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that for Ti = 0 agents choose
either to invest always or never (independently of their private signals).
Consider the latter possibility ￿rst, i.e., consider a pure-strategy equi-
librium with Ii(0;0) = Ii(0;1) = 0. Then, along the equilibrium path,
nobody ever invests and, for any agent i = 1;:::;n, Ti = 0. Hence, Ti = 0
does not reveal any information on the true state of the world. Since
the posterior probability that ! = 1 is still r, agent i is better o⁄by fol-
lowing his informative signal ￿i. Next, consider the case of investment
after Ti = 0, i.e., an equilibrium with Ii(0;0) = Ii(0;1) = 1. In this
case, along the equilibrium path, only the ￿rst agent in the sequence
observes that nobody else has invested before. That is, Ti = 0 if and
only if i = 1. Hence, after observing Ti = 0 agent i knows that he is the
￿rst agent in the sequence and, thus, should follow his signal. Finally,
suppose that for Ti = 0 agents choose to play against their private infor-
mation, i.e., consider a pure-strategy equilibrium with Ii(0;￿i) = 1￿￿i.
Then, along the equilibrium path, after observing Ti = 0, agent i knows
8that he is either the ￿rst in the sequence or all other agents before him
have received good signals. In both cases, he should follow his signal.￿
While we have shown that in any IPE an agent who observes zero in-
vestments should follow his signal, it remains unclear whether such equilibria
exist. The next lemma identi￿es a necessary and su¢ cient condition under
which an IPE does indeed exist.
Lemma 2 An IPE exists if and only if r ￿
1￿qn
2￿(1￿q)n￿qn.
Proof We ￿rst prove that it is indeed optimal for an agent i to follow his
own good signal after Ti = 0 provided that everybody else follows his
signal after Ti = 0, and that the condition stated in the lemma holds.
(Notice that what another agent j does for Tj > 0 is irrelevant for agent
i￿ s optimal choice of Ii(0;￿i)). Assuming such behavior of others, an
agent i who observes Ti = 0 and ￿i = 1 attaches to the good state a
posterior of






j=1(1 ￿ q)j￿1 + (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ q)
Pn
j=1 qj￿1.








Solving for the sums and rearranging the terms, we get the condition in
the lemma. To complete the proof we have to show that an agent i who
assumes that the others play according to the rules stated in the lemma
and who observes Ti = 0 and ￿i = 0 does not invest, i.e., we need that




























1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)
n. (1)
Since r < q we also have r
1￿r <
q




1￿(1￿q)n > 1. This can be rewritten as 2q > 1 + qn+1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)n+1
which is obviously true for q > 1=2.￿
Notice that the condition imposed in the lemma is always ful￿lled if r ￿
1=2, i.e., when the good state is initially at least as likely as the bad state, an
IPE always exists.
We now turn our attention to Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria that are
not initially pure. The next lemma trivially follows from Bayesian updating.
We state it formally because we shall need it later on. The lemma after
that shows that, in an equilibrium that is not an IPE, agents who observe
Ti = 0 never invest if their signal is bad, but will invest with some positive
probability if their signal is good.
Lemma 3 (i) In any equilibrium, Ii(Ti;1) ￿ Ii(Ti;0) for all Ti.
(ii) In any equilibrium, if 0 < Ii(Ti;0) < 1 then Ii(Ti;1) = 1, and if
0 < Ii(Ti;1) < 1 then Ii(Ti;0) = 0 for all Ti.
Proof In equilibrium, each agent will infer the same information from ob-
serving a particular value of Ti. Whatever the posterior induced by just
observing Ti, it follows immediately from Bayes￿rule that an agent who
has an additional good signal will be more optimistic about the good
state than an agent with a bad signal. The ￿rst part of the lemma
results from this consideration and from expected payo⁄ maximization.
The second part follows from the same argument and the additional
observation that mixing requires indi⁄erence.￿
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium that is not an IPE, Ii(0;0) = 0 and 0 <
Ii(0;1) < 1 for all i.
Proof Given Lemma 3 we just need to rule out an equilibrium with 0 <
Ii(0;0) < 1 and Ii(0;1) = 1. For an agent to be indi⁄erent between
10investing and not after observing Ti = 0 and ￿i = 0 we need Pr(! = 1 j
Ti = 0;￿i = 0) = 1=2. Using Bayes￿rule, this can be re-written as









where p denotes the probability with which all other agents who see




r(1 ￿ q)j ￿ (1 ￿ r)qj￿
(1 ￿ p)j￿1￿
= 0





the left-hand side is strictly negative for any positive p.￿
Having characterized equilibria that are not initially pure, we must discuss
whether they exist. The next lemma introduces a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for such mixed-strategy equilibria to exist.
Lemma 5 (i) Mixed-strategy equilibria with Ii(0;0) = 0 and 0 < Ii(0;1) < 1
for all i exist if and only if there is a p 2 (0;1) that solves
r[1 ￿ (1 ￿ pq)n] = (1 ￿ r)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p(1 ￿ q))n].
(ii) If such a p exists, it is unique.
(iii) A mixed strategy equilibrium does not exist for r ￿ 1
2.
Proof The ￿rst part of the lemma follows from observing that agent i￿ s in-
di⁄erence between investing and not investing after observing Ti = 0
and ￿i = 1 requires Pr(! = 1 j Ti = 0;￿i = 1) = 1=2. If all other agents
j 6= i use Ii(0;0) = 0 and Ii(0;1) = p, after applying Bayes￿rule and




(1 ￿ pq)j￿1 = (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ q)
n X
j=1
(1 ￿ p(1 ￿ q))j￿1, (2)
which is equivalent to the equation in the lemma.
11For the second part, observe that Pr(! = 1 j Ti = 0;￿i = 1) is strictly
decreasing in p.5
Finally, note that for r ￿ 1
2 the left-hand side of (2) is strictly greater
than the right-hand side for any value of p, which proves the last part
of the lemma.￿
This lemma completes our characterization of equilibrium decisions after
observing Ti = 0. In the following proposition we summarize what we have
learned so far.




2￿(1￿q)n￿qn ￿ r < 1=2 there is an equilibrium where agents who
observe Ti = 0 follow their signal but there may also be other (mixed-strategy)
equilibria where agents who observe Ti = 0 follow their signal if it is bad and
mix if it is good.
(iii) If r <
1￿qn
2￿(1￿q)n￿qn there can only be equilibria where agents who
observe Ti = 0 follow their signal if it is bad and mix if it is good.6
Proof The proposition follows immediately from the four previous lemmas
and the observation that
1￿qn
2￿(1￿q)n￿qn < 1=2.￿
Our analysis essentially shows that, when facing a situation with no pre-
vious investments, an agent should either follow his signal or use a mixed
strategy (only if the signal is good). An agent should never decide indepen-
dently of his signal, neither should he decide against it. This clearly indicates
that we should not observe a ￿down cascade￿where all agent choose not to
invest. In other words, to go back to one of our examples, a restaurant will
5While this is very intuitive (the higher p the more likely it is that an agent i￿ s potential
predecessors had bad signals if Ti is still zero) the easiest procedure to show this formally is
as follows. Let A = Pr(Ti = 0;￿i = 1 j ! = 1) and de￿ne B accordingly for the bad state.
Note that A = q
Pn
j=1(1￿pq)
j￿1 and B = (1￿q_
Pn
j=1(1￿p(1￿q))
j￿1. It is easy to see
that the claim follows if and only if AB
0 > A
0B (where A
0 is short for the derivative of A
with respect to p). It is also easy to establish that A > B. Finally, it remains to be shown
that B
0 > A
0. For that simply compare the summands in both expressions one by one.
6Notice that the third part of the proposition touches on an existence problem. For
obvious reasons we have restricted our analysis to symmetric equilibria￿ in case of bad
priors these may fail to exist.
12not stay empty forever only because it is empty when it opens. While this
puts already a lot of structure on the equilibrium solution of our game, we
still need to investigate what happens for di⁄erent values of the aggregate
investment Ti.
To this purpose, we establish in the next step an intuitive monotonicity
result, according to which a higher value of Ti is always good news: when an
agent observes a higher number of investments made before him, he cannot
be less willing to invest himself. Once this monotonicity lemma is established,
we will be able to prove two fundamental results about aggregate cascades.




i ;￿i) for both
￿i = 0 and ￿i = 1. In particular, if 0 < Ii(T0
i;￿i) < 1, then Ii(T00
i ;￿i) = 1.
Proof See Appendix.￿
While this lemma seems very intuitive (how could a fuller restaurant be
worse news than an emptier?) it is actually not trivial to prove it. At the
very core of the proof there is, however, some very basic logic operating.
Essentially, it is the earlier monotonicity result (in Lemma 3) which is driving
this one. Agents with good signals are more likely to invest than agents with
bad signals. Good signals are more likely to be generated in the good state
than in the bad state. Hence, Ti grows, on average, ￿faster￿in the good state
than in the bad state. Hence, the higher Ti the more con￿dent can we be
about being in the good state.
Equipped with Lemma 6 we are now ready to state our two main propo-
sitions that characterize which forms of cascades will or will not arise. In
particular, we will see that aggregate down cascades never arise, while aggre-
gate up cascades are always part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (i) In any equilibrium, Ii(0;1) > 0, and Ii(Ti;1) = 1 for all
Ti > 0, i.e., an agent with a good signal always invests with positive probability
(and invests with probability one after observing at least another investment)
and an ADC never occurs in equilibrium.
(ii) In any equilibrium, there can be at most one TMIX for which 0 <
Ii(TMIX;0) < 1. For all Ti < TMIX agents with bad signals follow their
signal and do not invest. For all Ti > TMIX, an AUC occurs in which agents
invest independently of their signal.
13Proof The ￿rst part of the proposition follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma
6. The second part follows again from Lemma 6.￿
The ￿rst part of the proposition clearly implies that there are no cascades
on the unobservable action. In particular, after observing at least one in-
vestment, agents with a good signal always invest. Incidentally, we note that
such a result just comes from an equilibrium argument. One could imagine
that, when facing a ￿low￿value of Ti, in order to make his decision, agent i
should consider all possible sequences and attach a probability to the event
that he is the ￿rst in the sequence, or the second, etc. After all, a low number
of investments may merely come from the fact that only few agents had the
opportunity to invest so far, in which case the low value of Ti should be con-
sidered good news. Or it could arise from many agents having the option of
investing but few only using it, in which case the low Ti should be viewed as
bad news. All this inference process could be quite complicated. Our analysis
solves the problems by just invoking some equilibrium arguments.
The second part of the proposition hints at the possible role of aggregate
up cascades. But from all we have established so far it could be that TMIX ￿
n, i.e., that agents always follow their signal (or mix) such that an AUC never
arises. The next proposition, however, shows that AUCs do arise￿ and are,
in fact, part of any equilibrium.
Proposition 3 AUCs are part of any equilibrium. In particular, in any equi-
librium Ii(Ti;￿i) = 1 for all Ti > n
2.
Proof Consider an agent i who observes Ti > n
2 and suppose he knew that
he were the last agent in the sequence. Further suppose there were no
AUC. If Ti = TMIX, then for Ti = TMIX + 1, an AUC would occur
by Proposition 2. If, instead, Ti 6= TMIX, then, due to Lemma 6, this
agent knows that there were at least Ti good signals and no more than
n ￿ Ti ￿ 1 bad signals. Hence, even if this agent￿ s own signal is bad,
he knows that there were altogether more good signals than bad signals
and he will decide to invest. Of course, agent i can￿ t be sure that he
really is the last agent. But if he isn￿ t, this means that there were fewer
bad signals so far, while he can still be sure that there were Ti good
signals. Hence, an agent who observes Ti > n=2 will always invest and,
thus, trigger an AUC.￿
14￿i = 0 ￿i = 1
Ti = 0 0 mixed;1
0 < Ti < TMIX 0 1
Ti = TMIX mixed 1
Ti > TMIX 1 1
Ti ￿ TUP 1 1
Table 1: Structure of all equilibria. Entries indicate whether the agent mixes
or invests with probability 0 or 1.
The value n
2 is just an upper bound for the critical mass of observable
choices that triggers an AUC. Depending on the parameters￿values, AUCs
may well be triggered earlier. But AUCs are indeed part of all equilibria. Of
course, this does not necessarily imply that AUCs will actually be triggered,
since there is always the possibility of su¢ ciently many bad signals occurring
such that the critical Ti that triggers an AUC may not be reached.
We summarize the structure of equilibria in Table 1. The rows in the table
indicate possible values of Ti, while the columns indicate the two possible
signal realizations. Note that not necessarily all the values of Ti in the table
exist. In particular, TMIX might not exist. For this reason, the last two
rows of the table have the same entries. Notice also that if TMIX exists, then
TUP = TMIX +1. In any case, the basic structure of all equilibria is captured
in the table and is nicely monotonic.
4 An example
Let us now illustrate our theory through a simple example. The example
shows how constructive the results that we have illustrated above are. Con-
sider the case in which n = 3 and r ￿ 1=2. From Proposition 1 we know that
Ii(0;￿i) = ￿i and from Proposition 2 we know that Ii(2;￿i) = 1 and that
Ii(1;1) = 1. Thus, the two propositions alone immediately give us the equi-
librium actions for ￿ve out of the six possible contingencies agents can face.
The only remaining question is now what agents do after observing Ti = 1
and ￿i = 0. As is clear from the results illustrated in Table 1, this depends on
further conditions on r and q. Let us ￿rst check under which conditions agent
i rationally follows his bad signal. Recall that we are analyzing a symmetric
15equilibrium, therefore suppose each other agent j chooses Ij(1;0) = 0. Then
it is optimal for agent i to do the same if his posterior for the good state is
not bigger than 1=2, i.e., if
r[q(1 ￿ q) + 2q(1 ￿ q)2]




which is equivalent to




Similarly, Ii(1;0) = 1 is optimal if
r[q(1 ￿ q) + q(1 ￿ q)2] ￿ (1 ￿ r)[q(1 ￿ q) + q2(1 ￿ q)].
which is equivalent to
q ￿ 3r ￿ 1 ￿ q.
Note that q ￿ q. Hence, in the case in which q > 0 and q < 1, we
obtain three equilibrium regions. For q < q there is a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium in which Ii(1;0) = 1 and an AUC starts with Ti = 1. For q >
q there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which Ii(1;0) = 0 and an
AUC starts only with Ti = 2. Finally, for q ￿ q ￿ q both the two pure-





We have introduced a new model of information cascades. The crucial dif-
ference between our model and those already in the literature is that only
one action taken by agents is observable by others. When it is their turn to
make the binary decision, agents simply receive aggregate information about
how many others before them took the observable action. We argue that this
setup arises naturally in many scenarios: for example, when entrepreneurs
seek investors they will typically not inform them about how many others
have turned them down before, but, surely, they will mention who else de-
cided previously to invest in their project. This asymmetry in observability
dramatically a⁄ects all equilibria in such games. Most importantly, there can
be no ￿down cascades:￿if an action is unobservable, there can never be an
information cascade where agents take this action.
16Our result has important implications. In particular, it implies that a
new, good project (e.g., a technological innovation, a new product or service,
a new medical treatment) will not be neglected for ever simply because there
is lack of interest at the beginning. Sooner or later (i.e., as soon as people
start receiving good information on it) the new project will start di⁄using. A
lack of initial interest will not represent a barrier to future adoption because
of informational considerations.
Our study has also an important consequence for applications where a
third party can decide which information it is to release. In the introduction
we mentioned the case of an agency in health policy. Such an agency must
decide how to disclose information on the adoption of a new treatment: to
inform the doctors on how many others have already decided to adopt the
new treatment; inform them on how many have considered doing it but have
decided to stick to the old practice; or, ￿nally, to reveal both, the number of
doctors in favor of the new practice and the number of physicians in favor of
the old one. Can the way the information is disclosed make a di⁄erence for
the di⁄usion of the new treatment? Suppose the agency is uncertain about
the e⁄ects of the new treatment and considers as the worst case scenario the
situation in which the new treatment is widely adopted while ultimately re-
sulting in worse health outcomes than the old treatment, for instance because
of side e⁄ects. Which disclosure policy should the agency employ? Intuitively,
one would think that the disclosure of all available information should maxi-
mize social welfare. This is, however, only true if the welfare analysis focuses
on doctors and excludes patients. The standard intuition does hold: With
more information the doctors will always be better o⁄. But as soon as the
doctors￿interests are not perfectly aligned with that of patients￿(perhaps
because patients care more about their own lives than their doctors do) the
picture changes. Since the agency may want to maximize patients￿welfare
rather than doctors it may, in the light of our results, optimally withhold
some information. By withholding information on a particular decision (e.g.,
the number of doctors who decided to adopt the new treatment), the agency
can, in fact, guarantee that an informational cascade on that decision does
not occur.7 This may rule out the worst case scenario where many patients
7In their seminal paper on information cascades, Bikhchandani et al. (1992) have argued
that the adoption of medical procedures is often based on fairly weak information and that
17die because of severe side e⁄ects of the new treatment. A full-￿ edged welfare
analysis is beyond the scope of our paper, but these considerations show that
it can be an important topic for future research.
Models of social learning have been extensively tested in the laboratory,
with results sometimes supportive and sometimes less encouraging for the
theoretical analysis.8 We have studied the behavior of human subjects in a
laboratory setting that reproduces the model of this paper (Guarino et al.,
2008). Our preliminary results are encouraging. In just two simple treatments
we ￿nd that the main comparative statics go all in the right directions. In
particular, while we observe cascades on the observable action, cascades on
the unobservable actions either do not occur (in one treatment) or occur only
rarely (in the other). While this evidence is not yet conclusive, and although
some interesting anomalies emerge, our experimental results show that our
theory is able to capture some of the behavior we observe in the laboratory.
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6 Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 6
The proposition is equivalent to saying that in any equilibrium I(ti;￿i) ￿
I(ti + 1;￿i) for any ti = 0;1;2:::and both ￿i = 0 and ￿i = 1. Because of
expected payo⁄ maximization, this inequality holds if, whenever Pr(! = 1 j
19Ti = t;￿i) ￿ 1
2, we have Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t + 1;￿i) > 1
2.
There are four relevant possibilities:
1. Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 0) > 1
2 and Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 1) > 1
2
2. Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 0) < 1
2 and Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 1) > 1
2
3. Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 0) = 1
2 and Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 1) > 1
2
4. Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 0) < 1
2 and Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 1) = 1
2
Case 1 is the case of an informational cascade. In such a case,
Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i) = Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t + 1;￿i)
for both ￿i, and therefore the proposition obviously holds.
Now let us consider Case 2. In this case we want to show that Pr(! = 1 j
Ti = t + 1;￿i = 1) > 1
2 (while nothing must be shown for the case of a bad
signal). Suppose not, i.e., suppose Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t + 1;￿i = 1) ￿ 1
2. Let us
consider, ￿rst, the case of the strict inequality.
By Bayes￿rule,




As we suppose that this is strictly smaller than 1
2 we know that
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1;￿i = 1)
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0;￿i = 1)
<
Pr(! = 0j￿i = 1)
Pr(! = 1j￿i = 1)
.
which is equivalent to
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1)
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0)
<
Pr(! = 0j￿i = 1)
Pr(! = 1j￿i = 1)
.
By the law of total probabilities,
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1) (3)
= Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1;Ti￿1 = t)Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) (4)
+Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1;Ti￿1 = t + 1)Pr(Ti￿1 = t + 1j! = 1) (5)
= q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + Pr(Ti￿1 = t + 1j! = 1). (6)
Notice that the last equality comes from the fact that we are analyzing Case
2 and that we are assuming (by contradiction) no investment after observing
t + 1.
20Now the decision problem of agent i￿1 is identical to the one of agent i.
So, by applying recursively the same law, we obtain:
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1)
= q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + Pr(Ti￿1 = t + 1j! = 1;￿i = 1)
= q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + [q Pr(Ti￿2 = tj! = 1) + Pr(Ti￿2 = t + 1j! = 1)]
+q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + q Pr(Ti￿2 = tj! = 1) + [q Pr(Ti￿3 = tj! = 1)
+Pr(Ti￿3 = t + 1j! = 1)] + :::
= q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + q Pr(Ti￿2 = tj! = 1) + q Pr(Ti￿3 = tj! = 1)
+::: + q Pr(Ti￿m = tj! = 1)]
for some m (note that m depends on the value of i: indeed, for any value of i
there is an m such that Pr(Ti￿m = t + 1j! = 1) = 0). Similarly, conditioning
on ! = 0,
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0)
= (1 ￿ q)Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 0) + (1 ￿ q)Pr(Ti￿2 = tj! = 0)
+::: + (1 ￿ q)Pr(Ti￿m = tj! = 0):
Some algebraic computations show that for any pair of terms in the two
expressions above, the following inequality holds:
Pr(Ti￿j = tj! = 1)
Pr(Ti￿j = tj! = 0)
￿
Pr(Ti = tj! = 1)
Pr(Ti = tj! = 0)
:
Since we know that Pr(! = 1 j Ti = t;￿i = 1) > 1
2 and, therefore,
Pr(Ti = t j ! = 1)
Pr(Ti = t j ! = 0)
>
Pr(! = 0j￿i = 1)
Pr(! = 1j￿i = 1)
simple algebra shows that
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1)
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0)
>
Pr(! = 0j￿i = 1)
Pr(! = 1j￿i = 1)
;
a contradiction.
Note that the same proof holds true when, by contradiction, we assume
that




21The only di⁄erence is that in such a case
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1)
= q Pr(Ti￿1 = tj! = 1) + sPr(Ti￿1 = t + 1j! = 1);
where s represents the probability by which an agent receiving the good signal
decided not to invest. This change does not a⁄ect the above inequalities.
Finally, note that the proofs for Case 3 (for both the good and the bad
signal) and Case 4 are identical to Case 2 just described, with the exception
that in Case 3,
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1;Ti￿1 = t) = q + (1 ￿ q)u;
and
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0;Ti￿1 = t) = qu + (1 ￿ q);
where u is the probability of investment by an agent receiving a bad signal;
similarly, in Case 4,
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 1;Ti￿1 = t) = qu
and
Pr(Ti = t + 1 j ! = 0;Ti￿1 = t) = (1 ￿ q)u:
￿
22